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jL\RlE L. HELl\I, his wife, 
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Ko.10509 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATE~[ENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CASE 
This is an action for a Declaratory Judgment declar-
ing and determining the meaning of a lease between the 
plaintiff as lessee and the defendants as lessors, or m 
the alh·rnative, a reformation of said lease. 
DISPOSITION I~ Lff\VER COURT 
Smnmary J u<lgment was granted in favor of the de-
fondanb, and the plaintiff's :Motions to set aside the 
Summary Judgment, for permission to file an Amended 
Complaint, and for an Order requiring the plaintiff to 
lllakt:· depm,;its in court pendente lite were denied. From 
t]ip ~mrnnar.'- Judgment and denial of the plaintiff's 
Jlotion~, the plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOl-GHT OX APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a setting aside of the Summary J udg-
ment, an Order granting plaintiff permission to file its 
_\mended Complaint and an Order requiring the plaintiff 
to make deposits in court pendente lite. 
ST_\TE)lEXT OF F_\CTS 
On )lay 5. 1%1, the defendants \Yilburn Dale Helm 
and )larie L. Helm. his wife. as lessors. entered into a 
written lease agreement \\ith the plaintiff. rtah Cooper-
ative _\ssociation. l R. I). The leased property eonsisted 
of a senice station located on the old State highway just 
north of Orem, rtah. and the plaintiff undertook to oper-
ate the service station pursuant to the lease agreement. 
(R. 3. '·-!) 
_\t the time of entering into the lease tht> plain:iit and 
the def end.ants were a'nue that the leased premis.cs ,..-onl·l 
be ust'd by the plaintiff as a senil•e statil•n an.:i t~<.1: the 
new freeway nlrn· l"Olllpleted bet,._·een LeLi a:1d Pr,Y\•) ,..-a~ 
then bt'ing planned. ~R. 3. -!. hi. ~l1 \ 
Paragraph ; M' the 1ease be:,,·een c~.:- :;_·ar::.cs \YaS 
writtt'll tl) prl)vidt' as r'l)ill•ws: 
Lt·~~l)r ~11~111 ~ttt) in :·"--,!-.__~t:- ~1: -:~-=-~:~.- .:..s~~-.:-n.~·:. 
sur't'il•it'nt r'irt' aEd l'l•:::~·:·-=-:~e-Es~'"'" ~:::s·.::-ar.·:·.c. .::" 
t llt' i._,aihi. in~ : l' : 1 ~F : .- :· : '.>:· :-c · ~;.~:· ._- ::- ·-· · .::.s :: .. _:.:<·:·:: 
' ~,. J l' .-l J" ... ; ~ .. : :. :, ~.--: ..... -.1 :..........,~ -...... ,~...:.,- .... -7.-4} ~.-\-l)t ~<Uu 'ell lllL~ ·- •. -- l--~·-'"C:-. -· - - .• - --- - . - - . 
flrt1 1..)r 1..)tht?~· '-~~1~~l.~L:y. \\-~--~"" .. ~~ ~ ~~~-~-- ~-~:.:. __ ~- -:~:~~:~-
a L .."1~~ ~ 1 :1:-~;.~<t: \._<~:.::~~-- ::: :·~:.~.- _: __ -_ ~~~--~ ~-:-~ ~:-
t':'t 1\::ly :l~'~'~·:l:·. l:' :'..· :·:-c::.::'--'-" ::.:·-::- :--::-:: :-:C:-i 
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such damage or destruction, or if, for any reason, 
the possession or beneficial use of the premises 
is interfered with, the rent hereunder shall abate 
until the premises are fully restored to fitness 
for occupancy or such interference has ceased. 
It is understood and agreed that if by reason of 
any law, ordinance or regulation of properly con-
stituted authority, or by injunction, lessee is pre-
vented from using all or any substantial or mate-
rial part of the property herein leased as a service 
station for the sale and storage of gasoline and 
petroleum products, or if the use of the premise:; 
as a service station shall be in any substantial or 
material manner restricted, or should any govern-
rnen tal authority refuse at any time during the 
term or extension of this lease to grant such per-
mits as may be necessary for the installation of 
reasonable equipment and operation of said prem-
ises as a service station, then the lessee may, at its 
option, surrender and cancel this lease, remove 
its improvements and equipment from said prop-
erty and be relieved from the payment of rent or 
any other obligation as of the date of such sur-
render. 
rpon eompletion of the contemplated freeway, due to the 
alteration of the flo"· of traffic away from the leased 
1•remises, the plaintiff sought to exercise the option to sur-
n-·ncler and cancel the lease and be relieved from the pay-
llll"nt of rent or any other obligation pursuant to the 
term::: of iiaragraph 'j' set forth above. ( R. 5, 16, 5:3) How-
1"\er. the defendants contended that the plaintiff had no 
iizht to exercise the option and demanded that the plain-
tiff continue to pay to the defendants the rental pay-
1:1,~nt:-: reserved by the lease. IR. 5, 16, lS. 53) Subse-
, :>ntl,\·. tht_• plaintiff's original complaint was filed on 
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July 1, 1965, (R. 15, 52) \\-hereby the plaintiff sought a <k-
claratory judgment allowjng the plaintiff to exercise the 
option described. Thereafh•r the defrndants answered the 
complaint, denying that the plaintiff was entitled to the 
relief prayed for. (R. 16) The defendants then moved 
for summary judgment based upon the complaint and the 
answer thereto and the affidavit of \iVjlburn Dale Helm, 
one of the defendants, which affidavit was filed along 
with the motion for summary judgment. (R 17, 18) 1\f r. 
Helm's affidavit stated that paragraph 7 of tht~ lease 
between the parties "was intendPd to cover situations 
in which the lessee was prevented from using the station 
by reason of an act of law, ordinance or regulation. That 
it did not encompass circmnstancPs such as that com-
plained of in the plaintiff's complaint." The plaintjff then 
filed the counter-affidavit of Mr. Erval Hansen who af-
firmed that he had negotiated the lease with the dPfrndant 
-Wilburn Dale Helm on behalf of the plaintiff and that 
the terms of paragraph 7 pleaded in the plaintiff's 
original complaint were intended by the parties to pro-
vide the plaintiff with the right to terminate the lease 
in the event the contemplated freeway substantially im-
paired the profitable operation of a service station on the 
leased premises. (R. 20) In addition, a second counter-
affidavit was filed by the plaintiff, wherein Mr. \V. B. 
Robins, the Executive General Manager of the plaintiff, 
affirmed that the "subject matter of said lease, the situa-
tion of the parties, the purposes of the parties had in 
mind at thP time the lease \Vas made and other surround-
ing circumstances showed that it was the intent of the 
parties to provide" the plaintiff with tlw right to tenni-
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nate the lease in the event the completion of the contem-
plat<>d freeway substantially impaired the use of the 
k•ased prerni ses as a St~rvice station. ( R. 22) 
At the hearing on the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment, the defendants introduced in evidence a 
letter (R. 2G) from Henry C. Helland, State Director of 
Highways, to defendants' counsel, wherein Mr. Helland 
stated: 
A public hearing for the proposed interstate 
highway from Provo to Lehi was held in Provo 
on February 2-±, 1958. The route as presented at 
tht~ hearing with minor modifications was official-
ly adopted by the Road Commission on March 17, 
1958. 
H was stated at the hearing that hopefully 
the construction would start in late 1958 and be 
completed about three years after starting. Bids 
on the first construction in the area \Vere opened 
on February 17, 1959 and the total route dedicated 
and officially opened to traffic on August 28, 196-±. 
The facts stat<'d by l\fr. Helland are not in dispute. 
The hearing on defendants' motion for smnmary 
jmlg111ent \Vas held before the Honorable J. L. Tuckett, 
who took the matter undpr advisement. Thereafter, a 
minutP entry (R. 25) was filed indicating that the defend-
ants' motion had been granted and a summary judgment 
was filed dismi,,;sing the plaintiff's action with prejudice. 
( R. -±7) It is interesting to note that the Honorable Joseph 
E. Nelson signed the summary judgment, although the 
lwaring had been held lwfore the Honorable J. L. Tuckett. 
(H. ~5, 47) 
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After being notified of the summary judgment 
against it, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the 
summary judgment, (R. 55) togeether with motions for 
permission to file an amended complaint, (R. 51) and for 
an order requiring the plaintiff to make deposits in court 
pendente lite. (R. 50) In Count I of its proposed amended 
complaint, ( R. 27), the plaintiff sought declaratory relief 
based upon that portion of paragraph 7 of the lease plead-
ed in its original complaint. (R. 28) In Count 11 of its 
proposed amended complaint the plaintiff sought declara-
tory relief based upon that portion of paragraph 7 which 
reads as follows : 
. . . [i] f for any reason the possesion or bene-
ficial use of the premises is interfered with, the 
rent hereunder shall abate until the premises are 
fully restored to fitness for occupancy or such 
interference has ceased. ( R. 30) 
In addition, in Count III the plaintiff's proposed amend-
ed complaint alleged an alternative cause of action for 
reformation of the lease to make it conform to the actual 
agreement of the parties. (R. 31) 
By its motion requiring it to make deposits in court 
pendente lite, the plaintiff sought the court's permission 
to pay into court the $275.00 per month reserved as rental 
payments under the terms of the lease. (H. 50) 
The plaintiff has not used the leased premises for any 
purpose whatsoever since January 1, 1965, and since that 
date the premises have been vacant and have produced no 
income to the plaintiff, ( R. 53) and although the plaintiff 
used its best efforts to sublet or otherwise economically 
use the property, it has been unable to do so since January 
1, 1965. ( R. 53) 
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B1?tween January 1, 1965, and the time the plaintiff 
fik·d its motion for an order reqiuring deposits to be made 
into court pendente lite the plaintiff paid to the defend-
ants the monthly rental of $275.00 per month or a total 
of $2,750.00, during which time the plaintiff received no 
income from the property. (R. 53). The amount of $1,-
100.00 of the $2,750.00 paid as aforesaid was paid between 
the time this action was filed on July 1, 1965, and the filing 
of plaintiff's motion for the requested order. (R. 53, 54) 
After a hearing on the plaintiff's motions, the court 
rPfust>d to set aside the summary judgment and denied 
thP plaintiff's motion for permission to file its proposed 
mnPncled complaint and also denied the plaintiff's motion 
for an order requiring the plaintiff to make deposits of 
the monthly nmtal in court pending the termination of the 
litigation. (R. 8G) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
rrHE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DE-
:D'1'~NDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JlTDGl\IENT AND REFUSING TO SET 
ASIDE SAID SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
THE REASON THAT PARAGRAPH 7 OF 
rrHE LEASE CLEARLY ENTITLES PLAIN-
rrIFF 'l'O THE RELIEF SOUGHT. 
The lease executed by all parties to this action pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows: 
7. Lessor shall keep in force at their expense, 
sufficient fire and comprehensive insurance on the 
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building to pay for the repair or construction of 
~~id building if it is damaged or destroyed by 
fire or other casualty, which policy shall contain 
a loss payable clause in favor of lessee as its inter-
est may appear. If tht' inernises are rendered 
wholly or partially unfit for occupancy by any sueh 
damage or destruction, or if, for any reason, the 
possession or beneficial use of the premises is 
interfered with, the rent hereunder shall abate 
until the premises are fully restored to fitness for 
occupancy or such interference has ceased. It is 
understood and agreed that if by reason of any 
law, ordinance or regulation of prnperly consti-
tuted authority, or by injunction, Lt'ssee is vre-
vented from using all or any substantial or mate-
rial part of the property herein leased as a serviee 
station for the sale and storage of gasoline and 
petroleum products, or if the usp, of the premises 
as a service station shall be in any s11l1stc111tial or 
material manner restricted, or should any govern-
mental authority refuse at any time during the 
term or extension of this lea~ .. w to grant such per-
mits as may be necessary for the installation of 
reasonable equipment and operation of said prem-
ises as a service station, then the Lessee may, at 
its option, sitrrendcr and cancel this lease, remore 
its improvenients and equipment from said prop-
erty and be reliPved froni the payment of rrnt nr 
any other ol>li9ation cts of the date of such sur-
render. (Emphasis added.) 
The portions of paragraph 7 emphasized abow, by 
use of the phrase "shall be in any substantial or material 
manner restricted" leave no doubt that the construction of 
a new highway resulting in a great alteration of the flow 
of traffic away from the leased premises, as alleged ill 
plaintiff's original complaint and in 1Count I of the pro-
posed amended complaint, is a ground for termination of 
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the lease. Th(~ generic, all inclusive term "any", like the 
other terms used, is to be taken and understood in its 
"ordinary and popular sense." (See 2 Jones on Evidence, 
-1:91, p. 950 (5th Ed., 1958).) Certainly, the alleged con-
struction of the new highway and resulting great altera-
tion of the flow of traffic constitutes a "manner" by which 
thP use of the premises as a service station were substan-
tially and materially restricted. 
\Yith regard to the present case, the conclusion as to 
what the phrase means can be no different if the entire 
sentence, of ·which the phrase forms a part, is considered 
as a \YholP. 'J'he parenthetical phrases on either side 
S1JPak of governmental manners and means of restricting 
the nse of thP 1n·pmiscs as a service station. If the phrase 
''in any substantial or material manner" is likewise un-
derstood to includP only restrictions from acts of govern-
ment, then the recent construction of a new highway in 
the art•a of tlw leased premises, as alleged in plaintiff's 
original and proposed amended complaint, would enable 
tlie plaintiff to terminate the lease as a result of the gov-
enmwntal act of constructing the highway. 
Tn audition, the plaintiff's contention that the subject 
provision is plain and unambiguom; on its face, is sub-
stantiated by a consideration of paragraph 7 as a whole. 
1t ht>conH~s obvious to tlw reader that paragraph 7 gives 
to tht> LPsst>e thl' option to abate the rent due and con-
tirnw the kast>, or terminate the lease and be relieved of 
an;-' f'mther obligation thereunder, if the use of the prem-
ic:('" as a service station is interfered with or restricted 
for an>· reason or by any means. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the language of para-
graph 7 of the lease between the parties clearly entitles 
the plaintiff to the relief prayed for in its original and 
proposed amended complaints. The trial court's summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant, and dismissal of 
plaintiff's original complaint with prejudice is erroneous 
as a matter of law. 
POINT NO. 2 
ASSUMING THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT SUS-
TAINED IN ITS CONTENTION SET FORTH 
IN POINT 1 HEREIN, THE COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\IENT AND REFUS-
ING TO SE'T ASIDE SAID SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT FOR THE REASON THAT THE OP-
POSING AFFIDAVITS FILED BY THE 
PARTIES RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE AS 
TO MATERIAL FAiCTS. 
Inasmuch as the defendants filed with their Motion 
for Summary Judgment an affidavit wherein the def end-
ant, Wilburn Dale Helm, stated that paragraph 7 of the 
lease was not intended to permit plaintiff to terminate the 
lease for the reasons alleged in plaintiff's original com-
plaint, and and the plaintiffs filed counter affidavits 
sworn to by plaintiff's agents stating just the opposite, 
unquestionably issues of fact were created. Therefore, 
the only real question for consideration here is whether 
the contested facts are material, which materiality turns 
upon the application of the parol evidence rule. 
The law as to the propriety of granting a smrnnary 
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judgment, where application of the parol evidence rule 
is involved, was impressively stated in Kidman v. White, 
1-1 U t. 2d 142, 378 P .2d 898 ( 1963). ·when remanding for 
trial, following summary judgment granted by the trial 
court, this court stated as follows: 
In confronting the problem presented on thi~ 
appeal, we have been advised to remain aware that 
a summary judgment, which turns a party out 
of court without an opportunity to present his 
evidence, is a harsh measure that should be grant-
ed only \Vhen, taking the view most favorable to 
a party's claims and any proof that might be 
proper, that might properly be adduced there-
under, he could in no sense prevail. That both 
lrnrties hereto make plausible arguments that 
the contract in question is so manifestly in their 
favor that reasonabk, minds could not see it the 
other way is a pointed commentary of the ability 
of the human mind to rationalize in its O\Vn inter-
ests. It is equally so upon the desirability and the 
propriety of resolving any doubts in favor of per-
mitting courts and juries to settle such disputes 
rather than ruling upon them summarily as was 
done here. 
'fo the same effect see Tanner v. Utah Poultry and Farm-
cres Cooperative, 11 Ut. 2d 353, 359 P. 2d 18 (1951). 
Frnm the foregoing it is apparent that a summary 
judgment where the question of parol evidence is before 
the court, should not be hastily indulged. With regard 
to tht'. pr0sent case, if parol or other extraneous evidence 
is admissible to ascertain the intention of the parties 
to the lease, then the summary judgment was erroneously 
granted. Fundamentally, in Utah as elsewhere, the ad-
missa bility of parol or other extraneous evidence 
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turns on whether the writing undPr ronsideration is un-
certain or ambiguous. It is the plaintiff's position, as 
discussed in Point 1 herein, that paragraph 7 of the lease 
in question is so clear and unambiguous as to entitle 
the plaintiff to terminate the }Pase with impunity, without 
resorting to extraneous or parol evidence. Hmnver, 
should th(' court conclude that the language in question 
does not clearly support the plaintiff's contention, then, 
at the very least, it must be said that the language is un-
certain or ambiguous, thereby making extraneous or 
parol evidence admissible for the purpose of explaining 
what was meant by what was written in paragraph 7. 
In Radley v. Srnith, 8 l~tah 2d 1, 31:3 P.:2cl -tfi;J (Hl:\'i'), 
this court held: 
Whenever uncertainty or ambiguity exist with 
respect [to a writing] it is proper for t!te ronrt to 
consider all of the facts and circurnstanres, in-
cluding the ·words and actions of t!te parties 
forming the background of tht> transaction. 
The same rule was adopted, couched in different 
terms, in Continental Bank & Trust Compa11y vs. Steu,art, 
4 Ut. 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 ( l 935), wherein it was held: 
In view of the lack of definiteness in tht> tPrnls 
of the contract it is proper for the court to re-
ceive extraneous evidence as to its meaning. It 
is true that the expressed terms and agreement 
may not be abrogakd, nullifiE•d or modified b,\' 
parol testimony; hut wlwre lwcamw of vaguPn('f'~. 
or uncertainty in tlw languge mwd, tlw intent ol 
the parties is. in question, the court may ro_nsider 
the situation of the parties, the facts arnl (•trrn111-
stanees smTonnding thP making of the eontraet, 
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the purpose of ih; execution, and the respective 
claims thereunder, to ascertain what the parties 
intended. 
In tlH' Radley and Co1zti11c1ital Bank cases, note the use 
of the terms "uncertainty" and ''lack of definiteness" and 
"vaguent>ss," whicl1 conditions, like an ''ambiguity" au-
thorizt> the admission of parol evidence. The notation i::s 
meaningful, for if the language of the lease in paragravh 
I, n'liPd on in plaintiff's original complaint and in Count 
I of plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, does not 
clearl.r and unnequivocably 0ntitle the plaintiff to a favor-
ablP judgment, or if the comt does not deem the language 
ambiguous, tlteJl, with in the context of this case, the 
language· usPd eertai11ly smack::s of "uncertainty," ''lad\: 
o[ d(•finil('lWSS" 01' "vagU<'lll'SS." rl'his must be SO, for 
11aragraph I obviously does not say '"the s<>rvice station 
lease may 11ot be ter111i11atcd if the higlnrny con::struction 
gTPatly alters the flow of traffic away from the leased 
vn·rni:,.;es." In this connection, the holding in Bamberger 
Co1111H111y r. Certified Productions, Inc., 88 Ut. 194, 48 P. 
2d 4~9 ( 1935) is pertinent. '11 herein, faced with the con-
stnwtion of a lease, the court held the lease ambiguous 
and ('Ondud<•d that the allegation:,.; in the defendants' an-
swPr had been improperly stricken by the trial court, then 
wrote, a:s follows at +8 P.2d 29-t: 
As stated before, we must give the defendant the 
b<•nc>fit of evnry iuqJlication or inference which 
rnay ari:,.;e out of tlw language of the parts strick-
t>n. Certainly, if tlw contract itself states definite-
ly, so that then~ is no latent or patent ambgiuity as 
to what altPrations are required, then there would 
he no room for any <·YideneP as to what the parties 
eontPmplated as eornprising the nPcessary altera-
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tions. If, on the other hand, the co11tract u·hile 
on its face appearing to be certain u·ould OJJl'H 
up an ambiguity u·hen attempts u:ere made to 
apply it to the subject matter, then such ambiguity 
could be resolved by evidence of u·hat mea11i11g 
the parties thernselues intended to iwcest such 
terms. (Emphasis added.) 
In so stating, the court relied upon Kalueder 1;s. Jose1Jh 
Schlitz Breiving Compa11y, 1-+3 "\Vis. 3-1-7, 128 ~."\V. -13, 
wherein it was 'vritten: 
Ambiguity in a written contract calling for con-
struction may arise as well from words plain in 
themselves but uncertain when applied to the sub-
ject matter of the contract, as from ·words which 
are uncertain in their literal sense. 
So also it may be possible for this court to conclude 
that the words ''if the use of the premises as a service 
station shall be in any substantial or material manner 
restricted," as used in paragraph 7, are plain and certain, 
as has been previously contended by the plaintiff, hut 
uncertain when applied to the subject matter of the lease. 
In either event, it was error for the trial court to grant 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
Upon application of the language of paragraph 7 to 
the subject matter of this lmvsuit, it is difficult to com-
prehend how anyone could conclude that paragraph 7 of 
the lease was intended to mean anything other than that 
the plaintiff could elect to terminate the lease as alleged 
in plaintiff's original complaint and in Count I of the 
plaintiff's proposed amended complaint. In this regard, 
the present case is similar to Brimirood llomcs, Inc. t'. 
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K1111dscn Builders Supply Company, 14 Ut. 2d 419, 385 
P.2d 98:2 ( 1963), ·wherein this court had before it for con-
sideration the following language used in a receipt and 
lit>n relt•ase which had been executed by the defendant, 
Knudsen Builders Supply Company: 
This receipt is executed and delivered by the un-
dersigned to the association to induce it to make 
payment to the undersigned of the above stated 
sum from the funds held bY it for the owner of the 
above described real pro1;erty and in considera-
tion thereof the undersigned hereby waives, re-
leases and discharges any lien or right to lien the 
undersigned has or may hereafter acquire against 
said real pro1wrty. 
Knud:sen Bnilders Supply contended that it was the in-
tention of the parties in drafting the release as set forth 
above, that said dc,fendant would release its right to a lien 
only as to tlw amount set forth in the authorization and, 
further, that tlwre was no consideration to support the 
promisf~ to release any right to a lien that it might there-
after acquire. On the other hand, the plaintiff contended 
that tl:e releasP was a three-party agreement whereby 
the vlaintiff offered to pay the defendant, through its 
agent, the association, upon the condition that the defend-
ant release its lien rights, both present and future. In 
spite of the langnage of the release, which on its face 
simpl~- does not contain the qualification claimed by the 
dPfondant, the court had the following to say: 
l'11dcr the circumstances of this case, we do not 
lwlit>ve that the defrndant, nor the plaintiff, in-
trnded that the relem;e and waiver agreement 
would relate to anv future lien rights which de-
ft.ndant might acql;ire. The executed documents 
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designated as a 'release and waiver' relakd only 
to the particular debt paid and n~ceipted for i~ 
the particular transaction encompassed by that 
particular instrument. This included any lien the 
def<mdant 'has or may hereafter acqui1.'e against 
the said property' in regard only to that particu-
lar debt. (Emphasis addPd.) 
In the present case, it could also be said that "under 
the circumstances of this case" the parties never inh•nded 
that the plaintiff would be unconditionally bound by a 
ten-year lease while knowing that the profitable use of 
the leased property as a service station "·as in jeopardy 
by the intended freeway construction in Utah County. 
No one can be so naive as to think that this particular 
circumstance was not a very important consideration in 
May of 1961 when the lease ·was executed. The point made 
here also finds support in the -Utah cas(' of Pen Star J.lli11-
ing Company v. Lyman, 64 Ut. 3±3, :231 P. 107 (19:2-t) 
wherein it was said: 
There is still another principal, which is also wPll 
established, that, in case the meaning of tlw lan-
guage is doubtful, one party to the contract will 
be held to that sense in whch he lm<'W or nnd<'r-
stood the other party understood the doubtful 
word or language. 
Regardless of what the defendants now say was intended 
by the language used in paragraph 7 of the lease, it can-
not be seriously disputed that the defendants knew that 
plaintiff ·was relying on the language of paragraph 7 to 
provide a protective option allowing the plaintiff to ter-
minate tht.~ lease in the ev!:'nt the highway construdion 
substantially impaired the profitahl<~ use of tlH· ll·asPcl 
prernisP8 as a servic<• station. 
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The rule in Cain v. Hagenbarth, 37 Ut. 69, 106 P. 
!.l-±5 ( 1910) is also pertinent. The rule is as follows: 
·when the exact meaning of a written contract is 
in doubt, as where the language used is contra-
dictory and obscure, and there are two interpreta-
tions possible, one of ·which establishes a compara-
tively equitable contract and the other an uncon-
scionable one, the former should prevail. 
At the time the lease was executed the business risks 
occasioned by the intended highway construction were 
apparent to all parties concerned. To read the lease today, 
so as to conclude that the defendants incurred none of 
these risks, while the plaintiff accepted the entire burden 
of loss, ·would be manifestly unconscionable. 
'11here is another very important consideration. A 
n•velant exception to the parol evidence rule \Vas recently 
adopted in Bul!ough vs. Sims, lG Ut. 2d 304, 400 P. 2d 20 
(1%5). This court therein restated the general propo-
sition that imrol evidence cannot alter or change the plain 
meaning of a document. However, in the language of the 
court, "there are exceptions; one of which is that when 
Uw varties place there own construction on it and so 
perform, the court may consider this as persuasive evi-
clcnee of what their true intention was." In the Bullough 
case, the parties had entered into a written agreement 
sdtling the estate of their deceased father, and then 
for several years thereafter engaged in conduct which 
was contrary to the terms of the agreement. This court 
;;im11l.\' held that the conduct created an ambiguity re-
ganlless of the language of the document, and therefore 
rnlc•cl that <'vidcnce of the conduct was admissable for the 
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purpose of ascertaniing the intention of the parties to 
the original agreement. By way of analogy, in the pre-
sent case, the conduct of the defendants has implied an 
ambiguity inasmuch as the defendants first suggPstPd 
that paragraph 7 of the lease was not clear by filing 
a factual affidavit with their motion for summary judg-
ment. The plaintiffs then filed counter-affidavits directed 
to the intention of the parties so far as paragraph 7 is 
concerned, and thereafter the defendants introduced into 
evidence at the hearing of their motion for summary 
judgment, a letter which they contended supported their 
position as to what paragraph 7 actually meant. By 
their conduct, the defendants have admitted that para-
graph 7 of the lease is ambiguous and uncertain so far 
as they are concerned. If the defendants are right in 
this admission, then certainly parol evidence became 
material in order to ascertain the true intention of the 
parties to the lease, and the court erred in granting the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
A case very similar to the present controversy, and 
one which helpfully summarizes several applicable rules, 
was decided in California in 1952.In Bartell vs. Associ-
ated Dental Supply Company) 11-! 'C.A. 2nd 750, 251 P. 
2d 16 ,1952), the court had before it for consideration 
the following paragraph of a lease: 
From and after January 1, 1949, the lessee i~ 
granted the right to cancel this lease upon six 
months writtPn notice or, at its option, shall be-
come entitled to a reduction of nmt to be agrePd 
upon mutually between tlw parties hNeto in tlw 
event that the business of lt>SSPP has deelinPd to 
a degree that it would he impossible to pay tlw 
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rent herein provided, due to any or all of the 
following causes or reasons, viz: Competition of 
the Federal, state or other governmental author-
ities in the field of dentistry by health insurance 
or any other media directly affecting the practice 
of dentistry or in the ewnt of a material decline 
in general business conditions or a major national 
financial or business depression or recession. 
fl1waking of the above-quoted provisions of the lease, the 
court stated as follows: 
... Let us examine the clause in question. Pos-
sibly a cursory reading of it might support de-
fendants' contention that because of the 'or' the 
lessee was given an absolute right to cancel while 
the right to reduce the rent was conditional. But 
a more thoughtful study of it, in view of the other 
provisions of the lease, particularly the provision 
for a five-year term [citing authorities] prevents 
one from determining 'to a certainty and with 
sureness' what is meant. On the very face of it, 
it does not appear reasonable that parties would 
contract that after January 1, 1949, (three years 
after the beginning of the lease) the lessee, with 
or without n•ason, could cancel, but his right to 
an undetermined reduction in rental should be 
conditional. 
The difference of the meanings sought to be 
given by the parties to the paragraph amounts, 
in effect, to the question of whether or not there 
:-;]10uld have been a comma between the words 
'notice' and 'or.' 'That very fact shows the un-
certainty of the paragraph. provisions. A matter 
as important as a lease of business property at 
$650.00 per month shonlct not be determined by a 
court from the writing alone as to whether a 
comma was intended or not. Such a determination 
could lw only a guess .... 
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The same may be said of the case now before this court, 
for a lease of business property at $275.00 per month 
for a period of ten years for the imrpose of operating a 
service station on said property, which lease was entered 
into by the parties knowing full well that a highway 
would be constructed in the area of the leased Jlremises 
which could reasonably be expected to divert traffic 
away from the premises, is sufficiently important not 
to resort to a guess as to what the k•ase means. 
\Vhat was said in the final paragraph of the Bartell 
opinion adequately states the contention of the plaintiff 
in this Point No. 2: 
In our case, the language of the lease is fairly 
susceptible of either of the constructions con-
tended for and, hence, extrinsic Pvidence [ma>· 
be] properly resorted to in order to determine thP 
intention of the parties. 
POINT NO. 3 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY DENYING PLAINTIFF'S :M 0 rr I 0 N 
FOR LEA YE TO FILE AN AThHJNDED COM-
PLAINT. 
By its proposed amended complaint, the plaintiff 
alleged as ·Count I precisely the sanw allegations that 
were contained in plaintiff's original complaint, which 
complaint was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. By Count 
II of the proposed amended complaint, the plaintiff 
sought a total abatement of the monthly rental based 
upon an entirely different provision of paragraph 7 of 
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the lease than had been alh'ged in the original complaint 
and in Count I of the proposed amended complaint. The 
proposed amended complaint also contained Count III, 
~which Count stated a cause of action for reformation. 
Our Utah Hule of Civil Procedure 15 authorizes 
amPndPd and supplemental pleadings as follows: 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his plead-
ing once as a matter of course at any time before 
a responsive pleading is served or, if the plead-
ing is one to which no responsive pleading is per-
mtted and the action has not been placed upon 
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time 
within twenty days after it is served. Otherwise, 
a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the advPrse party; 
and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
reqiiircs. A party shall plead in response to an 
amended pleading within the time remaining for 
respons(~ to the original pleading or within ten 
days af tc>r service of the amended pleading, which-
ever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8 ( e) (2) provides as 
follows: 
A party may set fort two or more statements of 
a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, 
either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defrnses. ~When two or more state-
ments are made in the alternative and one of 
them made independently would be sufficient, the 
pl<-'ading is not made insufficient by the insuffi-
ciency of one or morr' of the alternative state-
rnPnt~. A party may also state as many separate 
daiins or defonses as he has regardless of con-
si st<'nc~-, and whether 11ascd on k'gal or on equit-
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able grounds or on both. All statements shall be 
made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 
11. 
Also relevant to this inquiry is Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure lS(a) which provides in pertinnent part as 
follows: 
(a) J oinder of Claims. The plaintiff in its com-
plaint or in a reply setting forth a counter-claim 
and the defendant in an answer setting forth a 
counter-claim may join either as independent or 
as alternate claims as many claims either legal or 
equitable or both as he may have against an op-
posing party .... 
From the fon•going etah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
it is apparent that the plaintiff's proposed amended 
complaint was not unacceptable because more than one 
claim or cause of action was stated, nor because alterna-
tive relief was prayed for, not because the claims may 
not have been entirely consistent. 
More particularly, Rule 15 clearly indicates that 
permission to amend a pleading shall be liberally granted. 
As was stated by Justice vVade in Ballard i:s. Buist, 8 
Ut. 2d 308, 333 P. 2d 1071 (1959): 
It has always been the rule in this State to be 
liberal in the allowance of amendments to the 
end that there can be a complete adjudication of 
the controversy upon the merits and so that 
justice may be served. 
In addition, although it was decided prior to the enact-
ment of our present Rule 15, Provo City vs. Claudin, 91 
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Vt. GO, P. 2d 570 (193G) contains the following pertinent 
comment by Justice Wolfe: 
It. n~ust be noted that the court may, upon sus-
tammg a demurer, refuse to permit an amend-
ment to a pleading if it deems no amendment can 
be made which will circumvent the ruling .... In 
such case, the pleader is virtually out of court, 
it is as if the court had said, 'your pleading is 
not good in law and, under the facts as I appre-
hend they can be pleaded, you cannot state a good 
action or defense in law.' N aturallv it is not . ' 
usually done on a first complaint or answer be-
cause the court cannot ordinarilv know that other 
facts to make the pleading good ~annot be pleaded. 
And a refusal to permit pleading over where it 
does not appear positive that no cause of action 
or defense can be pleaded may run easily into 
an abuse of discretion. 
For those alternate reasons stated in POINTS 1 
and 2, the plaintiff contends that Counts I and II of 
the proposed amended complaint state valid claims 
against the defendants, and the trial court was required 
eitlwr to grant the declaratory relief prayed for in both 
complaints or permit the amendment and receive com-
petent evidence at trial as to what paragraph 7 means. 
Contrary to the factual situation in the Claudin case 
<1uoted above, in the present case the trial court was 
not left to speculate as to whether additional facts not 
allegPd in the plaintiff's original complaint could be 
pleaded to state a good cause of action if an amended 
complaint \Vere pennitted. This is so for the reason that 
the plaintiff placed before the trial court its proposed 
am<'nded complaint, and Counts II and III thereof state 
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additional, separate, alternate basis for relief not pleaded 
against the defendants in the original romplaint. 
In Count II of the proposed amendm<mt the plain-
tiff prays for a total abatement for the rent based upon 
those provisions of paragraph 7 which read as follows: 
. . . [i] f for any reason, the possession or bene-
ficial use of the premises is interfered \Yith, the 
rent hereunder shall abate until the premises are 
fully restored to fitness for occupancy or such 
interference has ceased. 
Like the language or paragraph 7 relied on in plaintiff's 
original complaint and in Count I of the proposed amend-
ment, which plaintiff contends clearly entitles the plain-
tiff to the option to terminate the lease, it is submitted 
that thP additional provisions of paragraph 7 as set 
forth immediately above are clear and unambiguous in 
providing the plaintiff with a total abatement of tlw 
rent under the circumstances pleaded in Count II. If 
this is not so, then again, at the very least, it must be 
said that the language is uncertain or ambiguous so as 
to make parol or other extraneous evidence not only 
admissible but desirable for the purpose of determining 
the meaning of the phrase. This is so for tlw reason 
that the provision obviously does not say "there shall 
be no abatement of rent in the event the new highway 
alters the flow of traffic away from the leased premises.'' 
As to Count III of thP proposed amendment, therein 
is alleged a valid cause of action for reformation of the 
lease. The critical point here, is that the parol evidenee 
rule is not applicable to an action for reformation. (~Pe 
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8i11c us. Harper, 118 Ut. -U5, 222 P. 2d 571 (1950), and 
l)pgnan, Parol Evidence - The Utah Versio11, 5 Utah 
Law Revie\v, 158, 175 ( 195G). vVe are, therefore, hard 
pressPd to fathom any legitimate reason why the trial 
court refused to permit the plaintiff to file its proposed 
amended complaint so far as Count III is concerned. As 
was indicated earlier, if the trial court read the provi-
sions of paragraph 7 of the lease contrary to the con-
h_•ntions of the plaintiff and also erroneously concluded 
that paragraph 7 was not uncertain or ambiguous so as 
to permit the admission of parol or other extraneous 
evidence to explain its meaning, then \Ve can understand 
why summary judgment was granted and why the trial 
court would have been reluctant to permit an amended 
complaint setting forth the causes of action described 
in Counts I and II of the proposal. However, the same 
cannot be said for whatever reason the court might have 
had for prohibiting the pleading of Count III. The hold-
ing in Lone Star Motor Imports, Inc. vs1• Citroen Cars 
Corporation (C.A. 5th, 1961) 288 F. 2d 69 is in point. It 
was there held that ·where no grounds \vhatsoever exist 
for denial of leave to amend, the test for abuse of dis-
cretion is satisfied and the trial court must be reversed 
upon appeal. It \vill not do now, to say that the trial 
court's refusal to grant the plaintiff permission to file 
its provosed amended complaint was harmless, inasmuch 
as und<T the familiar rule of res judicata the dismissal of 
the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to the motion for sum-
mary judgment would bar a subsequent prosecution of 
th1• elairn for reformation, inasmuch as the claim for 
l'<'fonnation arises out of precisely the same facts and 
c·i r<·nrn stanePs as the claim described in the plaintiff's 
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original complaint. (See Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 U. 2d 
45, 37G P. 2d 9-!G ( 1962).) Thus, tlw refut>al to allow thl' 
plaintiff to file its proposed amended complaint is tan-
tamount to a dismissal of the cause of action for rPfor-
mation of the lease without any hearing whatsoever. 
Surely, such action on the part of the trial court was 
an abuse of discretion. 
In the present case, the plaintiff's motion for leave 
to file the proposed amended complaint was made within 
ten days after the plaintiff received notice that the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment had been 
granted. In addition, no prejudice whatsoever would havl' 
resulted to the defendants had the plaintiff been allowed 
to amend its complaint, plaintiff's motion was the first 
occasion permission to amend had been sought, the mo-
tion was not an attempt to delay the proceedings, nor 
can it be said the motion was made in bad faith. On 
balance, it is submittetd that the letter as well as the 
sprit of the law applicable to this issue clearly favor 
allowing the plaintiff to file its proposed amended 
complaint. Dnd<_•r the circurnstanc<>s of this case, the 
trial court's refusal to permit the proposed amendment, 
in the language of Justice Vv olf P, ran ''easily into an 
abusr of discretion." 
POINT NO. 4 
THE TRIAL COURT I1~RRED IN DENYING 
PLAIN'rIFF'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
REQ1TIRING PLAINTIFF TO l\IAKF, DE-
POSITS OF THE .MONTHLY RJ1~N'l1AL INTO 
COURT PEND1£NTE LITl~. 
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Before tlw trial court, the plaintiff sought an order 
n-'quiring it to withhold from the defendants the monthly 
n·11tal payments provided for in the lease, and make 
dt•posits of same into court pending a termination of 
the adion. After inception of the lease on June 1, 1961, 
tlw plaintiff undertook to operate a service station on 
the leased premises. Beginning in the spring of 1965, for 
those reasons alleged in plaintiff's original complaint, 
the plaintiff communicated to the defendants its desire 
to cancel the lease and be relieved from any further 
obligations thereunder. Ho\vever, the defendants refused 
to allow cancellation and this action was subsequently 
counnenced on July 1, 1965. 
rrhe plaintiff has not used the leased premises for 
tlH~ operation of a service station or for any other pur-
pose since .January 1, 1965, and since that date the 
Jll'Plllises have been vacant and have produced no income 
whatsoever to the plaintiff in spite of the plaintiff's 
({forts to sublet or otherwise economically use the prop-
Prty. Between January 1, 1965, and the time of plain-
tiff's motion for the requested order, the plaintiff paid 
to the defendants a total sum of $2,750.00, and between 
tht~ time this action was started on July 1, 1965, and the 
time of plaintiff's motion the plaintiff paid to the defen-
clant8 the sum of $1,100.00. 
A. 
Plaintiff is Entitled to Relief from Payment of Rent 
to ihe Defendants Pendcnte Lite. 
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The Utah Declaratory J udgnwnt Act provides in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
78-33-1. Jurisdiction of District Courts-Form-
E_ffec~. ~h~ ~istrict courts within their rP:spt><> 
hve Jnnsd1ct10n shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations, wlwther 
or not further relief is or could be claimed. No 
action or proceeding shall be open to objection 
on the ground that a declaratory J·udcrment or • b 
decree is prayed for. The declaration may lll' 
eitlwr affirmative or nPgative in form and effoet; 
and such declaration shall have the force and 
effect of a final judgment or decree. 
* * * 
78-33-12. Chapter to be Liberally Construed. 
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its pm-
pose is to settle and to afford relief from wtcer-
tainty and i11security tcith respect to rights, sta-
tus and other legal relations; and is to be lilwra\l~· 
construed and administered. (Emphasis added) 
The plaintiff has already paid to the defendants $1,100 
since the beginning of the prPsent action on .July 1, 19G5. 
Assuming the relief sought by this appeal is granted 
in whole or in part, in order to afford the }Jlaintiff corn· 
plete relief from ''uncertaintly and insecurity" with rl'-
spect to its rights in and to the monthly r<>ntal install-
ments, relief from the payment of said paym<>nts to the 
defendants pendente lite is essential. On the other hand. 
in order to fully protect the inter<>sts of the defendant~ 
in this regard a requirement that the plaintiff deposit 
said payments into court punmant to Section 78-:.2'i-J, 
l~tah Code Am1otated ( 1933) would he proper. 
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Affording such relief to the plaintiff and securing 
such protection for the defendants ·would comply most 
conqJlekly \Yith the legislative mandate of Section 78-
:J:J-12 wherein it is provided that the Utah Declaratory 
.Jmlgment Act is to be liberally construed and admin-
isiere<-1. Pursuant to that Act, the pleadings before the 
eomt contain prayers for declaratory and equitable relief 
which relief will not be fully available to the plaintiff un-
less the court permits the plaintiff to withhold the 
monthly rental installments from the defendants pending 
the outcome of the present action. All parties to the 
Lt>ase are engaged in a genuine dispute as to the 
nwaning of the lease. Therefore, we can conceive of no 
good reason why the plaintiff should be singularly bur-
dened with the loss, and risk of loss, pending a deter-
mination by the courts as to what the lease means. 
The risk and potential loss incurred by the plain-
tiff upon withholding the monthly rental payments from 
tlw def Pndants, without court approval, are substantial 
since a breach of the lease by failure to pay the rent 
rPserved rould subject the plaintiff to an action for 
dmnagPs, forfeiture of the lease, and possibly treble 
damages as vrovided for in Section 78-3G-10, Utah Code 
Annotated ( l953). In the alternative, payment of the 
l't>nt to the defendants followed by plaintiff's action to 
n•cover-back any portion of the rental payments paid 
to the defendants, in the event the plaintiff prevails in 
tlw pn•sent action, would be extremely tenuous in view 
of tlw rule stated in 32 Am. J ur., Landlord and Tenant, 
~Pdion -±72, as follows: 
It is the general rule that payments 
voluntarily made, although not owing, 
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are not recoverable back, and if the pay-
ment or rent demanded of a tenant is 
deemed voluntary in law, the tenant can-
not recover such payment even though 
the amount demand<~d and vaid \ms not 
owmg. 
It is submitted that allowing the plaintiff to withhold 
the monthly rental payments from the defendants upo11 
condition that said payments bt> deposited with tht' court 
fully comports with the spirit and letter of the contrnlling 
legislation. Equitably, the plaintiff is Pntitled to such 
conditional rt>lit>f. 
B. 
The Order Sought by Plaintiff is 
procedurally proper. 
Section 78-7-24, Utah CodP Annotated ( 1953) pro-
vides as follows : 
Process and Procedure when Statutory Pro-
vision Insufficient. -When jurisdiction is, by sta-
tutt>, conforred on a court or judicial officer, all 
means necessary to carrv it into dfect are also 
given, and in tiie exerci;e of jurisdiction. If the 
course of proceeding is not specifically pointed 
out, any suitable process or mode of proceeding 
may be adopted which may appear most conform-
able to the spirit of the statute or of the rules of 
procedure. 
As originally enacted in Utah, Section 78-7-24 reads a~ 
follows: 
\Vhen jurisdiction is, hy statute, conferred 
on a court or judicial officer, all mPans nccPssary 
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to carry it into effect are also given· and in the . ' exercise of the jurisdiction, if the course of pro-
ceeding be not specifically pointed out by statute, 
any suitable~ process or mode of proceeding may 
he adopted \Vhich may appear most conformable 
to the spirit of the statute or of the codes of pro-
cedure. 
(It should be noted that the punctuation in the original 
vcr:--;ion of the section is different than it appears in the 
1953 Code. A careful reading of the two versions clearly 
indicates that the most recent version is in error and 
that the section should be read, punctuated as it was 
enacted originally.) 
lt cannot be questioned that Section 78-7-2-± is appli-
cable to the present action since the jurisdiction to ren-
der declaratory judgments has been expressly conferred 
upon the Utah district courts by Section 78-33-1, set 
forth above. Nor can it be questioned that inherent with-
in the power to render a declaratory judgment is a 
court's power to protect the rights of the respective par-
ties to the prseent action. As was discussed in Point 4-A 
ahove, according to Section 78-33-12 a district court has 
th(~ power to "afford relief from uncertainty and inse-
curity with respect to rights, status and other legal re-
lation:--;." Therefore, Section 78-7-24 is merely a legislative 
mandate to the courts to adopt whatever procedure may 
Ile lll'C'essary to implement their power. 
In sum and substance, Section 78-7-24 is the statu-
tor~· authority for creating whatever remedy or mode 
ul' procedure is proper, just, and equitable under the 
iiarticular circumstances of a given case. Said section 
32 
is a codification of the ancient maxim, uui jus, iui re-
niediitm, 'vhich maxim means where there is a right, 
there is a remedy, and whieh maxim was quoted with 
apvroval Ly the l~tah Supreme Court in State v. Mor-
gan, 23 Utah 212, 228, 6-± Pac. 356, 361 (1901). Although 
there is no Utah legislation expressly describing the 
order requested by the plaintiff, the Morgan case con-
firms a court's right to devise new remedies, wlH're 
neither the common law nor statute provide the necessary 
remedies. rrhe Morgan case holds that the right to devise 
new remedies was long ago recognized as vart of every 
court's inherent power. 
A situation similar m many respects to the fact~ 
and circumstances of the prescnt action was the subject 
of TVatts v. Greenwood, 49 Utah 118, 1G2 Pac. 72 (191G). 
In that case the plaintiff-mortgagor sought a writ of 
mandamus from the Supreme ·Court to the District Court 
of Millard County compelling the District Court to 
comply with the Utah statute which provides that when 
a mortgagee has connuenced a chattel-mortgage fore-
closure by advertisement, and it is made to appear by 
the affidavit of the mortgagor that the mortgagor ha8 
a legal counterclaim or other valid defense against the 
collection of the whole or any part of the amount dm 
and secured by the mortgage, the court may, by an 
appropriate order, enjoin the mortgagee from fore-
closing the mortgage by advertisement, and direct that 
all further proceedings for the fon•closure be had in 
the District Court. In the TYutt0 case the mortgagor had 
filed the necessary affidavit and originally the court had 
entered the order requiring all further proceedings for 
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the foreclosure to be had in the District Court. There-
after, however, upon motion by the mortgagee the court 
required the mortgagor to execute an indemnity bond to 
hold the mortgagee harmless from loss for the reason 
that the mortgaged property consisted of livestock which 
would depreciate in value unless properly fed and cared 
for, and for the further reason that the expenses of feed-
ing and keeping the livestock would greatly depreciate 
the mortgagee's security. The mortgagor delivered the 
bond as requested. Thereafter, the mortgagee requested 
an additional bond which the mortgagor refused to pro-
vide. Thereupon, the court withdrew its original order 
directing that the proceedings for foreclosure be had in 
tlw <listrict court, and then allowed the mortgagee to 
forcelosc hy advertisement and sell the livestock. 
In discussing the various alternatives available to 
the District Court under the circumstances, the Supreme 
Court relied upon Comp. Laws 1907, Section 720 (now 
Section 78-7-:!J) and wrote as follows: 
As already pointed out, the [statutory pro-
visions J are purely remedial as well as highly 
<'<1uitable, and, although it nwy not be expressed 
in the section, yet the district judge or the dis-
trict court has full power to enforce the spirit as 
well as the letter of that section, and to that end 
may invoke any suitable remedy that may be 
jnst and equitable .... 
. . . Indeed, it 11.'011ld Sr'r'm to require no great 
i119c1wity to hold matters in status quo ar:d so 
coll(luct the proccedi11gs [ umder the a.pplicable 
statutory pro1:isio11s], that no inj11stice will res11lt 
to either party. (I~1uphasis added.) 
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The Watts case contains excellent examples of the 
inherent flexibility available to a district court, and the 
equitable considerations are very similar to those in-
volved in the present action. For in the case at bar as 
in the Watts case, it may be said: "Indeed, it would seem 
to require no great ingenuity to ... so conduct the pro-
ceedings ... that no injustice will result to either party.'' 
0 iven the general principles discussed above, grant-
ing of the order sought by plaintiff would be proper. 
However, more specifically, our research has disclosed 
one case where relief similar to that sought by the plain-
tiff has been considered. In Foitch v. Rollins, 146 F. 
Supp. 87 (Alaska, 1956), the plaintiff and defendants 
had entered into a real estate conrtact under the terms 
of which the plaintiff was to purchase from the defen-
dants certain real property. The contract called for the 
purchase price to be paid in installments, all of which 
accrued installments had been paid by the plaintiff on 
schedule. The plaintiff filed an action against the defen-
dants wherein he contended that after the execution of 
the contract he discovered that a substantial portion of 
the house erected upon the subject real property was 
encroaching upon a public street. He further contended 
that upon discovery of this encroachment he demanded 
that the defendants take necessary steps to remove the 
encumbrance by moving the house within the borders 
of the real property purchased. He then alleged the fail-
ure of the defendants to comply with his demands, and 
damages. 
Pursuant to Rule 67, Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the plaintiff sought the order of the court re-
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quiring the plaintiff, during the pendency of the action, 
to pay all further purchase installments under the real 
estate contract into the registry of the court. Rule ti7 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which deals 
with deposits in court, does not expressly authorize the 
relief sought by the plaintiff in the Fouch case, and as a 
matter of fact, the court commented "diligent inquiry 
fails to reveal cases decided on this facet of the rule." 
The court therefore went on to state, "I am disposed to 
determine this motion on the basis of the existing 
equities,'' and then granted the plaintiff's motion, per-
mitting the plaintiff to pay all amounts due and becom-
ing due under the real estate contract into the registry 
of the court pendente lite. 
Given the equitable considerations ansmg out of 
the facts and circumstances of this case and the broad 
and liberal interpretation to be accorded the Utah De-
claratory .Judgment Act and Section 78-7-2±, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), it is submitted that it was error for 
the trial court to deny the plaintiff's motion for an order 
l'equiring plaintiff to make deposits in court pendente 
lite. 
CONCLUSION 
As shown by this brief, the language of paragraph 
1 of the lease between the parties either entitles the 
plaintiff to the declaratory judgment prayed for in 
ils original complaint and proposed amended complaint, 
or tlw provisions of paragraph 7 are so uncertain 
and ambiguous as to admit of parol or other ex-
trnllPons ("Vidence for the purpose of ascertaining the 
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meaning of the lease, all of which make the trial court's 
summary judgment erroneous as a matter of law. It 
is also submitted that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in refusing to permit the plaintiff to file its 111'0· 
posed amended complaint, and that the trial court erred 
as a matter of law in denying plaintiff's motion for an 
order declaring the plaintiff to make deposits of the 
monthly rental in court pt>ndente lite. Therefore, the 
summary judgment should be vacated and set aside and 
the trial court should be ordered to grant plaintiff per-
mission to file its proposed amended complaint, and 
issue an order requiring the plaintiff to make deposits 
of the monthly rental in court pendente lite. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES 
& HENDERSON 
By KENT B LINEBAUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
